SAEe 2023 Aplication Packcage

Víctor Fernández Modrego

On this document, you will find the proposed paper to be presented at SAEe 2023 and, after the appendices, the documentation that proves that I am a doctoral student at the University of Valencia. The documents regarding my doctoral status are composed of the tuition summary and the receipt for the doctoral tuition during this academic year.

Territorial reorganization and its effect on population across municipalities: the case of the former Kingdom of Valencia, 1834-1930

Víctor Fernández-Modrego (Universitat de València)
victor.fernandez-modrego@uv.es

Alicia Gómez-Tello (Universitat de València and IVIE)
alicia.gomez-tello@uv.es

Daniel A. Tirado-Fabregat (Universitat de València)
daniel.tirado@uv.es

Abstract

This paper investigates whether there is a link between the establishment of a new political and administrative structure and hierarchy across territories and the uneven growth of populations within those territories. In the context of the rise of the liberal state in Spain from its origins in the 1830s to the advent of the Second Republic in 1931, we focus on the 1834 reform of the administration in order to assess whether the capitals of judicial districts (*capitales de partido judicial*), which the law entrusted with various supramunicipal administrative powers and functions, enjoyed a population premium compared to similar non-capitals during the period 1860-1930. We follow a propensity score matching (PSM) approach that enables us to match those municipalities assigned district capital status with other municipalities that had similar attributes during the ancien regime (according to the Floridablanca Census of 1787) but which did not become district capitals. Our findings give new insights into the uneven impact of the state-building process across the territory.

Keywords.- State-Building; Administrative Reform; Economic Development; Spanish Liberal State; Population Growth; Urban Development

JEL Codes.- H83; N13; N14; O11; R11

1.- Introduction

One of the greatest transformations undergone by European societies since the inception of liberal regimes has been the construction and consolidation of the modern state. Among many other things, this involved reorganizing the territory into new administrative divisions to take the place of the structure that existed during the ancien regime, the aim being to take the state administration to the citizens. In the case of Spain, this process was essentially completed in the early years of the liberal period, giving the territory a new structure that would remain virtually unchanged until the end of the Franco dictatorship.

Exploring these aspects, in this paper we argue that the liberal state's division of the territory into provinces (in 1833), judicial districts (1834) and municipalities (1835) may have asymmetrically altered the social and economic future of some population entities compared to others. Specifically, we are referring to those municipalities which, as part of the framework of the new state, were chosen to host structures with supramunicipal powers and functions involving administration, politics, jurisdiction, public order and safety, compared to those that were not. In addition, the administrative hierarchy of the municipalities may have been particularly important over the first third of the twentieth century when the state's capacity to take on the provision of public services was increasing. This is especially true if it meant the inhabitants of these towns had better access to transport and communications networks along with education and health infrastructures.

The main aim of this paper is to investigate the possible existence of differential socioeconomic development – measured in terms of population – in those municipalities that headed the intermediate administrative unit, i.e. the judicial district, introduced as part of the reform of 1834. These district capitals, unlike other municipalities, were home to various state structures that transcended the purely jurisdictional and political structures initially provided under the reorganization. As Burgueño (1996, p.191) points out: "The importance of the judicial district in Spain, especially in the nineteenth century, greatly exceeds its original function. As well as the administration of justice, the district capitals formed the official urban network used by the state to establish its peripheral services (tax offices, notaries, registry offices, health, education, civil guard, etc.) and were also the hubs around which the road network and communications in general were organized".

2

The work forms part of a nascent literature that studies the impact caused by the unequal distribution of state structures, powers and functions across the territory, these being concentrated especially in those locations that acted as nodes or hubs for government business.[1] Among this literature, Chambru et al. (2022) and Cainelli et al. (2022), for example, analyse the possible existence of a relationship between the way towns follow a pecking order in terms of administration and their unequal progress in terms of urbanization, population growth and socioeconomic development from a historical point of view, as seen in the territorial organization of liberal states.[2] Cainelli et al. (2022), in particular, show that there is a relationship between the designation of a municipality as district capital in 1865 and the differential growth of its population in the framework of Italy's unification process. Chambru et al. (2022), on the other hand, study the designation of departmental capitals in late eighteenth-century France and its impact on a number of variables related to their socioeconomic development. Their work points to there being a causal relationship between capital status, being home to various state structures and the differential growth of the population. As part of this literature, the hypothesis put forward in this paper is that in the case of Spain, the territorial organization of state business through the use of subnational units such as judicial districts generated a growth premium in those municipalities designated district capitals because it concentrated in them a good many supramunicipal functions and services.

However, the empirical analysis of this type of hypothesis suffers from a problem of identification. The choice of one municipality over another may actually be due to its pre-existing characteristics in terms of surface area, location or connectivity. Simply observing that there is a positive and significant relationship between a town's capital status and the size of its population does not therefore enable us to verify the original hypothesis, because the analysis comes up against an endogeneity problem that invalidates the results. At the end of the day, those entities designated capitals in the territorial reorganization of the liberal states may have retained various structural characteristics that in themselves contributed to their future development.

---

[1] See, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2015), Acemoglu et al. (2016), Lee (2019), Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2020), and Neubert (2023).

[2] The abundant literature includes papers that relate the way states organize their administration and the powers granted to subnational territorial entities, and in particular their capitals, as regards the urbanization processes both in recent times (Feiock and Kim, 2001; Andini et al., 2017; Bo, 2020; Bo and Cheng, 2021) and over the very long term (Bai and Jia, 2021).

Given these conditions, a study of the case of Spain and in particular the Valencia region represents an important contribution to the literature because it offers the possibility of carrying out the analysis while at the same time minimizing this type of problem. First, the new state would have instructed their *chancillerías* (chancellors' offices) to draw up proposals for the number of districts per province, the towns they would cover and what the capital of each district would be. These instructions would include the conditions to be met by candidates for capital status and would therefore also identify other eligible municipalities. And second, any study of Spain is made easier by the existence of a primary source, the Floridablanca Census of 1787, which provides detailed, accurate information about the characteristics of Spanish towns before the reform was implemented. This information includes population size, administrative category, jurisdictional regime and number of people working in different trades. In addition, combining these data for the 550 towns that make up the region of Valencia – which have been digitized, cleaned up and mapped – with data from other sources makes it possible to find out an area's connectivity to transport networks and physical geography. We thus obtain a spatial data infrastructure containing all the information we need to determine the structural characteristics observable in Valencian towns before the administrative reform of 1834.

The dataset constructed for the analysis connects the information for the eighteenth century, which is arranged according to the territorial arrangement in place during the ancien regime, with data taken from seven Spanish population censuses published during the period of our study, which break the territory down according to the municipal divisions in place in 1835. All this means that we have a homogeneous pathway that we can follow to learn how the population of municipalities in the Valencia region evolved between the late eighteenth century and the end of the liberal period in 1931. We can therefore identify the impact that capital status had on the population and assess how strong it was during the building process of a state that was constantly expanding its structures and services over the period 1833-1931.[3]

---

[3] The dataset includes homogeneous figures for the de facto population of municipalities in the Valencia region for the population censuses of 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930 following the aggregation carried out in Beltrán-Tapia et al. (2023). This transformed the 592 municipalities listed in the 1860 census into 537 homogeneous municipalities, taking into account changes in which municipalities joined together or split apart over those 70 years. The information has been linked to that for the 550 population entities in the Floridablanca Census (1787). This census does not provide any information for 48 of the homogeneous municipalities included in Beltrán-Tapia et al. (2023). In the process of building the dataset, information has been recovered from additional sources (the 1762 and 1793 censuses) for 7 of these municipalities. Thus, the dataset used in this paper groups the population into 496 territorial units or pseudo-municipalities with a homogeneous

4

On the basis of this information we have designed an empirical strategy made up of three stages. First, we start with observable characteristics from before the reform to estimate each town's probability of being designated district capital. Second, using these estimated probabilities we employ propensity score matching (PSM) techniques to link the various different district capitals with whichever other municipalities had the characteristics to be designated capital of the same district. Finally, with the treatment and control groups specified, we identify the existence of a capital status effect on population evolution in municipalities in the Valencia region over the period 1860-1930, taking into account the seven time points for which population censuses provide relevant information.

The text is divided into six sections. Section 2 briefly describes the administrative reform of the territory instituted by the liberal state that was in force throughout the period 1833-1931. In Section 3 we present the primary sources used to build the dataset that we use for our analysis along with the descriptive evidence included in it. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy followed to estimate the probability of a municipality being designated district capital (capitals) and match it with others that could have been designated but were not (peers). In Section 5 we detail the procedure followed to identify the impact of capital status on population levels in the municipalities and discuss the results. Finally, Section 6 presents our main conclusions.

2.- The new territorial organization of the state: the provinces and judicial districts of the Valencia region

One of the liberal legislators' priorities was to initiate the administrative reform of the territory. To this end Article 11 of the Constitution of 1812 established that "an appropriate division of the national territory will be made". However, the continuing situation of confrontation with French troops plus the political changes that occurred during these years, including the return of absolutist institutions from 1814, prevented this division of the territory from taking place in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

---

configuration for the period 1787-1930. The linking of the population entities that appeared in the Floridablanca Census of 1787 and the municipalities listed in the population census of 1887 was carried out under the framework of the ESPAREL project (Beltrán-Tapia et al., 2022) and can be consulted at www.esparel.com. No information on municipalities from the censuses of 1857 and 1897 has been used given their low reliability.

The military uprising led by General Riego and the return of liberalism to power during the period 1820-1823 put administrative reorganization back on the national political agenda. The government, at the behest of José Agustín Argüelles, Minister of the Interior, announced that it would be setting up a committee to design the new organizational divisions of the territory. On 17 March 1821 the Spanish parliament received a report from this committee – led by Felipe Bauzá, who had already worked on previous territorial organization projects, and José Agustín Larramendi – proposing that Spain should be divided into 49 administrative units called provinces. The authors explained the criteria they had followed in designing such a division: "The committee needed to consider the peninsula from various points of view, these being primarily surface area, population and wealth, taking into account the interests of the provincial elites". This new division therefore took as its base criteria the territory's surface area, population and economic level, while at the same time respecting as far as possible historical boundaries and divisions. The project was discussed in parliament and received several modifications that increased the number of provinces from 49 to 52. It was approved for implementation in what was known as the territorial division of 1822. However, the return to absolutism and its accompanying administrative structures from 1823 prevented the reform from being carried out (Melón, 1977; Burgueño, 1996; Burgueño, 2011).

After the death of Ferdinand VII and the accession of his wife to the throne as queen regent, on 21 October 1833 the liberal government put the then Minister of Public Works, Javier de Burgos, in charge of the project to reorganize the administration across the national territory. On 23 October the government created the figure of the Subdelegate of Public Works, who was to act as liaison between the government and the provinces. This signalled the start of its project for the administrative and territorial reform of the state (Pérez de la Canal, 1997). The territorial division devised by Javier de Burgos received approval in the Royal Decree of 30 November 1833. It established the province as the country's administrative unit in order to "facilitate the activities of the administration". The reform was basically the same as that proposed by Bauzá and Larramendi and also divided the territory into 49 provinces (Morán, 1990; Burgueño, 1996).

As far as the former Kingdom of Valencia is concerned, the 1821 report proposed that it should be divided into three provinces applying the criteria outlined above. The argument

used to support this, and the choice of capitals was as follows: "It is well known that this maritime province was big enough to form three new provinces of appropriate size, population and wealth (…) The provinces of Valencia, Alicante and Castellón were thus given shape. In the first two there could be no doubt as to the capital, while in the third, Castellón de la Plana was chosen as being more central and of greater size than any other town in the province". In the subsequent parliamentary debate on the subject, the province of Játiva was added. It was to be situated between the provinces of Valencia and Alicante, and its capital would be the town of the same name. However, the Javier de Burgos reform of 1833 did not take this modification into account and the Valencia region was divided into the three provinces described in the report of 1821. This division came into effect with publication of the Royal Decree.[4]

Once the territory was divided into provinces, the next stage was to subdivide these into even smaller units to allow "a swifter administration of justice", "for the great benefits that will be brought to the towns". Thus, in the Royal Decree issued on 23 April 1834 it was established that the territory would be divided into new administrative units known as *partidos judiciales* (judicial districts), which would take the place of the previous division based on *chancillerías* (chancelleries), *corregimientos* (districts of the chief magistrate) and *alcaldías mayores* (areas covered by local judges). This divided Spain into 451 units for the administration of justice. These units would also serve as a basis for constituencies in the parliamentary elections to be held that same year, the arrangements for which had been set in motion on 11 April (Orduña-Rebollo, 2000).

The division into judicial districts meant the consolidation of the new liberal-style territorial organization (Gómez-Díaz, 2008), while at the same time it exchanged the old regional power structures for new ones and stripped the *alcaldes ordinarios* (local representatives usually designated by the local elites) of the power to administer justice. The reference used to establish the borders of the judicial districts was that marked out by the 1833 division into provinces. In each of these there had to be sufficient judicial districts to bring the justice system to those who may have cause to use it. The division of 1834 would undergo few modifications and those that were made occurred mainly in the early years of the decree's

---

[4] Madrid Gazette, 3 December 1833, 154.

application (Capel, 1968).[5] Each judicial district was designed by taking account its population, level of communications and, as with the provinces, other historical and economic factors (Domingo, 2001).

The territorial reorganization established by this decree can also be traced back to the work done by Bauzá and Larramendi during the liberal triennium (1820-1823) and that done by the committee created for the purpose in December 1825 at the behest of the Minister of Grace and Justice, Francisco Calomarde, in which Larramendi also participated. After the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833, the new liberal regime instructed the two ministries that had powers and functions in the area (Public Works under de Burgos, and Grace and Justice under Garelly) to set up a commission to study the division of the territory into judicial districts. This was presided by Larramendi, thereby creating a link between the 1834 reform and the work carried out during the triennium and during the absolutist reign of Ferdinand VII. Proof of this is that only three months went by between the setting-up of the commission to look into the proposal in January 1834 and publication of the Royal Decree that authorized it on 21 April of the same year.

On the basis of the instructions given by the Ministry of Grace and Justice regarding the work carried out in these two periods, we should to a large extent be able to reproduce the characteristics that would have served not only to define the judicial districts but also to select their capitals.[6] The ministry ordered the provincial councils to come up with proposals for organizing each province into judicial districts in accordance with criteria concerning population, distances between towns located within them, communications and orography.[7] Capital status had to be assigned in such a way as to serve the greatest number of people. As regards the work carried out by the commission set up by Calomarde, we know that once it was completed, on 22 March 1829 the minister sent the judicial authorities (*chancillerías* and *corregimientos*) the instructions they were to follow when dividing the provinces up into judicial

---

[5] The organization into judicial districts underwent a thorough reform in the decree of 11 November 1965, which introduced a new judicial demarcation whereby 200 judicial districts and their capitals were abolished, being absorbed into districts that already existed or, in a few cases, being grouped together and given a new capital (Capel, 1965).

[6] In the framework of the regulations that emerged during the constituent period, Decree CCI, of 9 October 1812, which develops Article 273 of the Constitution of Cadiz, in its chapter on "district judges", establishes that capital status will be given to that entity which "because of its location, population, size and other circumstances is the most suitable".

[7] The instructions sent to the provincial councils stipulated that the choice of any municipality as district capital had to be justified as being "due to its location, population, size and other circumstances making it the best suited for the purpose". In other words, the same instructions as those laid down in 1812.

districts. According to these instructions and with the aim of bringing the administration to the people, each district had to be designed for a population of between 4 and 8 thousand inhabitants, the distance to be covered to access the service should not exceed 4 leagues or 4 hours' journey, and geography, communications and local customs should also be taken into account. Their capitals should be designated bearing in mind they should be centrally located and benefit the greatest number of towns.

In accordance with these criteria, the Valencia region was initially divided into 46 judicial districts which mainly took the name of their respective capitals.[8] Over the course of the nineteenth century this territorial organization underwent few changes. The most notable were, on the one hand, the abolition of the districts of Villarreal in the province of Castellón and Murviedro and Moncada in the province of Valencia, and on the other, the creation in Valencia of the Sagunto district along with the annexation of the Requena district, which until 1855 had been part of the province of Cuenca. The only change recorded towards the end of the century was the abolition of the Villar del Arzobispo district, although it was reinstated and reappeared in the 1910 census. Changes also affected the provinces to which some districts belonged, e.g. the Albaida and Gandía districts, which were included in the province of Alicante, became part of the province of Valencia. Table 1 shows the evolution of these changes in aggregate form.

Table 1. Evolution of the number of judicial districts in the Valencia region (1834-1930)

	1834	1857	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Alicante	16	14	14	14	14	14	14
Castellón	10	10	9	9	9	9	9
Valencia	15	18	18	17	18	18	18

Source: Royal Decree of 23 April 1834; list of judicial districts included in the population censuses of 1857, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930.

Some of the judicial districts in the Valencia region also underwent name changes between publication of the Royal Decree in 1834 and the census of 1857. Although the normal procedure was to give districts the same name as their capital, some were given the names of other places. These included the districts of Altea, the capital of which was Villajoyosa, and Callosa de Segura, capital Dolores.

---

[8] Madrid Gazette, 23 April 1834, 62.

Historiographers have itemized the powers conferred on the municipalities designated district capitals. Many of these were related to their main function, which was to be the seat of the examining magistrate's court, and for this they were provided with at least one judge. The district court would thus take over the functions that had previously been carried out by the *alcalde ordinario.* But being chosen capital of a judicial district not only meant that a particular municipality was consolidated as the seat of justice within a territory. It also involved another set of functions associated with the political side of the liberal state (the capital was the seat of the electoral constituency and was where the electoral board met to determine who could vote under census suffrage), the administrative side (from 1857 the connection between the civil registry located in the provincial courts and the local branches that could be found in town halls or municipal courts was the registry located in the district court) and the fiscal side (institutions such as the land registry and notary's office are bound to the judicial districts and follow the same territorial structure).[9] The capital was also provided with the structures necessary for carrying out sentences (district jails, a Civil Guard post) and organizing conscripted soldiers.[10]

In addition to all this, the state used the judicial districts and the municipalities that headed them as a territorial structure to roll out its services. Thus from 1855 the capitals acted as headquarters of medical, pharmaceutical and veterinary districts and had supervisory functions in these areas. The opening of pharmacies in the various locations, for example, had to be authorized by the pharmaceutical subdelegate of the district, who was normally the person in charge of the pharmacy in the capital (Puigvert, 2022). As for educational infrastructures, the territorial areas for primary education were the municipalities and for secondary education the provincial capitals, with no specific role allocated to the district capitals. Nevertheless, the district capitals attracted private investment in secondary education, as can be seen by the fact that they were home to many of the private institutions – both religious and secular – that were established over those years (Insa and Diez, 2022).

---

[9] The Law of 28 May 1862 on the Organization and Activities of Notaries established that the judicial district constituted the notarial district. The same applied to the territorial organization of the land registry in the Mortgage Act of 1861.

[10] The Prisons Act of 26 July 1849 organized penal institutions in Spain by rank and gave them a territorial structure. This organizational structure included what were known as village lock-ups, district jails and provincial jails. According to Articles 7 and 10, district jails would remand in custody those prosecuted for criminal charges, while those sentenced to *arresto mayor* (between a month and a day to six months' imprisonment) would also serve their time in them (Burillo, 2001). Additionally, every judicial district capital must hold a barracks of the Guardia Civil, the one of the national police forces. (Garcia, 2019)

Finally, insofar as they were territorial centres that had to bring together citizens and state administration, the capitals also became hubs for communications (postal and telegraph services) (Calvo, 2001) and transport (roads and railways).

On the basis of this evidence, which has been fully described by historiographers, the hypothesis we put forward here is that the creation of these state structures may have had an asymmetrical effect on the medium- and long-term growth trajectories of those municipalities established as district capitals compared to those that had similar characteristics but were not given the same powers and functions.[11] However, as we mentioned in the introduction, making a direct comparison between the growth trajectories of the district capitals and all the other municipalities does not allow us to correctly test this hypothesis because of the endogeneity problems. In this regard, the structural characteristics of a municipality—which are observed by the legislators— may affect both the fact of being district capital and the population growth. Therefore, we have to apply an empirical strategy able to correct for this fact.

3.- Empirical strategy

To overcome the endogeneity problem, it is necessary to build a dataset to gather together all the evidence relating to the municipalities characteristics before the territorial reform of 1834. This will enable us to determine—following the same criteria as laid down by the liberal legislators—which municipalities shared relevant characteristics and could therefore also have been considered district capitals. In this section it is explained the construction of the dataset and the selection of the peers.

3.1- Building the dataset

The dataset used to carry out our empirical exercise has been built by gathering and homogenizing information from a mix of primary and secondary sources. The main data source is the Floridablanca Census of 1787, which is considered one of the most trustworthy and detailed European censuses of the eighteenth century (Livi-Bacci, 1968; Pérez-Moreda,

---

[11] Roldán (1982) sums up the importance of having capital status in the context of the dispute between Santa Cruz de Tenerife and La Laguna to achieve that condition: "The loss of jurisdiction makes La Laguna, which because of its riches was once the capital of the Canary Islands, just another town of no consequence, equal in status to the little villages surrounding it".

2010; Reher, 1986) and reliable for the Valencia region (Castelló-Traver, 1978; Hernández-Franco, 1987). Through the digitization and georeferencing of the information contained in this primary source, we have collected population figures for all the towns in the Valencia region in 1787, along with details regarding their economic and administrative structures. Regarding the data for economic structure, we extracted information on the numbers of artisans, manufacturers and Crown officials in each population entity. We also gathered information on the category and jurisdiction of each of these places.

As for the availability of transport and communications infrastructures, details of the extent of these under the ancien regime were obtained from two additional sources. First, the dataset includes the number of post offices per population entity, which we took from the *Guide to Post Offices and Couriers* of 1830. And second, after obtaining the geolocation of the population entities and the layout of primary and secondary roads from Beltrán-Tapia et al. (2020), we were able to compute a variable that quantified the distance of the various municipalities from these transport infrastructures. The same source was used to complete the dataset with information about first-nature geography, such as temperature, rainfall, elevation, roughness of the terrain and soil quality.

The next step was to adapt the information, which had been computed on a territorial scale corresponding to the ancien regime population entities, to the scale established under the reform of 1835, i.e. the municipality. To this end we assigned each of the 550 population entities in the Floridablanca Census for the Valencia region (including the 9 that in 1787 did not form part of the Kingdom of Valencia)[12] to the municipalities created after the reform. Finally, given that the number of municipalities that make up the Valencia region has changed over the period studied due to splits and mergers, we homogenized all the information in such a way that it would be possible to process it using the same territorial divisions continuously between 1860 and 1930 (Beltran-Tapia et al. 2023).

The result is a dataset that includes the ancien regime characteristics of the Valencia region in a territorial arrangement composed of 496 homogeneous municipalities (or pseudo-

---

[12] The municipality of Sax belonged to the province of Murcia until 1836. In the same year, the municipality of Villena changed its administrative dependency from the province of Albacete to the province of Alicante. Furthermore, in 1851 the municipalities of Campo-Robles, Caudete, Fuente-Robles, Requena, Utiel, La Benta del Moro and Villargordo de Cabriel administratively moved to the province of Valencia from the province of Cuenca.

municipalities) for the period 1860-1930. To put it another way, we have homogeneously amalgamated the information on the population entities of the ancien regime with the administrative reorganization of the territory established by the liberal state until this came to an end in 1931.

3.2.- District capitals and their peers.

In order to identify all the municipalities that shared structural characteristics with the district capitals and could just as easily have been designated capitals themselves, we constructed a model to estimate the probability of becoming district capital in accordance with the parameters stipulated by the legislator in the instructions to be followed when configuring districts and designating capitals. As mentioned earlier, these referred to surface area, population, connection to transport and communications networks and, though to a lesser extent, other characteristics of a historical nature. Therefore, we propose a probit model to estimate the probability of being a district capital (equation 1):

$$\Pr(Cpj87 = 1|X)$$
$$= \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(p1787) + \beta_2 \ln(dist_{main}) + \beta_3 \ln(dist_{second}) \qquad (1)$$
$$+ \beta_4 long + \beta_5 lat)$$

Where the dependent variable (Cpj87) is a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if the population entity is the capital of a judicial district and the explanatory variables include that series of characteristics which, in line with the regulations, could define capital status.[13] *ln(p1787)* is the logarithm of the municipality's population in 1787, *ln(dist_main)* is the logarithm of the distance to primary roads, *ln(dist_second)* is the logarithm of the distance to secondary roads, and *long* and *lat* are the coordinates that mark its location in space. On the basis of these specifications, we estimated each municipality's probability of being designated capital of its judicial district (Table 2).

---

[13] In this exercise we considered the structure of judicial districts and capitals corresponding to 1887. The reason for this is that this structure, which underwent a number of changes between 1834 and 1887, remains stable from this time until the end of the period analysed (see Table 1).

Table 2. Results of Probit model for estimating propensity scores (Capitals and Peers)

(Equation 1)

Variables				
	Coeff.	SE	Z	p>Z
Population of municipality in 1787 (in logs)	1.744	0.23	7.37	0.000
Distance to primary roads (km) (in logs)	-0.00005	0.061	-0.00	0.999
Distance to secondary roads (km) (in logs)	-0.038	0.061	-0.63	0.528
Longitude	-3.93^{-6}	5.11^{-6}	-0.77	0.442
Latitude	3.93^{6}	2.03^{-6}	1.94	0.052

Source: The population levels of municipalities for the year 1787 come from the Floridablanca Census of 1787. On the other hand, the longitude and latitude of the municipalities and their distance to the primary and secondary roads come from Beltran et. al. (2020)

Starting from these estimated probabilities, we used PSM methodology, specifically the technique known as stratification (or interval matching). Table 3 shows the minimum and maximum probability values for each of these probability blocks and the number of municipalities found within them, distinguishing between judicial district capitals (capitals) and non-capitals.

Table 3. Block composition and probabilities

Block	Minimum probability	Non-capitals	Capitals	Total
1	0.014	91	7	98
2	0.2	17	7	24
3	0.4	11	8	19
4	0.6	3	8	11
5	0.8	0	11	11

Note: The municipalities with probabilities below 0.014 are not considered. The division into five different probabilistic blocks is automatically done it to respect the balance property. Source: see text

After we had estimated each municipality's probability of being designated district capital and classified these into five probability blocks, which respect the property of balance, i.e. the covariates in the control and treatment groups are balanced and can be compared (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Imbens and Rubin, 2015), we matched the capitals with other municipalities in the same judicial district, known as peers, which had probabilities that placed them in the same probability block or even higher than that estimated for the capital itself.

This procedure brought to light 13 judicial districts in the Valencia region that contained at least one municipality with a probability of being chosen as district capital that was similar to that of the municipality actually designated capital (same probability block) or even greater (higher probability block). A total of 48 candidate municipalities were identified, 13 of which gained district capital status, leaving 35 – which we refer to as peers – that did not. These 13 judicial districts contain a total of 196 municipalities. Maps 1 and 2 show how they are distributed across the territory, while Table 4 gives the basic statistics for the variables that structurally characterize the candidates, distinguishing between capitals and peers. Table 4 also shows the estimated t-test values for the difference in averages between both groups for each variable. These indicate that the differences between the treatment group (capitals) and the control group (peers) are not statistically significant[14]. Therefore, it shows that the pre-reform structural characteristics between capitals and peers are not statistically different, or, in other words, that the municipalities that become capitals have no observable characteristics that make them the only ones suitable to become capitals over nearby similar towns.

---

[14] Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1 lists the characteristics of the candidate population entities (capitals and peers) for each judicial district considered, along with its name. In other words, it shows the values of the main variables used in the probabilistic model for the 48 municipalities that make up the treatment group (capitals) and the control group (peers), ordered by the judicial district to which they belong.

Map 1. Judicial district capitals in 1887

Note: The district capitals relevant to this exercise are shown in yellow, while capitals not considered are in blue. These capitals are not considered because, following our identification strategy, we were not able to match them with a suitable municipality (Peer).
Source: see text.

Map 2.- Judicial district capitals and peers considered in this exercise.

Note: district capitals are in yellow and peers in red.
Source: see text.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics for capitals and peers

Variables	Capitals					Peers					T-test (p-value)
	Nº	Av	SD	Min	Max	Nº	Av	SD	Min	Max	
Main variables											
Capital status	13	1	0	1	1						
Candidate						35	1	0	1	1	
Main control variables											
Population of municipality in 1787	13	2546.53	1000.99	1055	4856	35	2425.97	1087.44	1155	4667	0.72
First-nature geography											
Temperature (ºC)	13	15.84	1.74	13	18.2	35	15.54	2.41	11	18.3	0.68
Rainfall (mm)	13	470	71.22	292	571	35	467.28	91.49	289	574	0.92
Elevation (m)	13	325.84	254.49	10	769	35	377.82	348.62	8	1067	0.62
Quality of terrain	13	192.32	86.74	47.46	316.83	35	183.67	74.69	24.92	309.94	0.73
Second-nature geography											
Distance to primary roads (km)	13	18.10	18.61	0.0065	60.74	35	20.67	20.15	0.019	66.94	0.12
Distance to secondary roads (km)	13	15.27	17.22	0.0017	53.34	35	16.93	16.24	0.008	53.16	0.50

Source: see text

4.- The effect of capital status.

The strategy for identifying whether or not there is a relationship between the administrative hierarchy of municipalities and the evolution of their population is based on the estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS) of a model in which the dependent variable is the population per municipality for the various points in time corresponding to the census years of 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920 and 1930 (Ln_Pop_{ti}). In addition, a group of control variables includes the territory's characteristics in terms of pre-reform population ($Ln\_Pop1787$), second-nature geography (communications and transport infrastructure and location), first-nature geography (rainfall, elevation, temperature, roughness of terrain and soil quality), economic structure (relative size of public services sector and manufacturing in employment) and longitude and latitude of each municipality to control for spatial autocorrelation (Voth, 2021) (equation 2).

$$ln(Pob)_{(i,1860,\ldots,1930)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Capital) + \beta_2(Candidate) + \beta_3(X_{(i,t)}) + \varepsilon_{(i,t)} \qquad (2)$$

As described earlier, however, a direct analysis of whether or not there is a relationship between district capital status and population size does not enable us to correctly identify the existence of a capital status effect. This is because the choice of capital could be related to pre-existing structural characteristics that might also affect the future demographic development of these municipalities.[15] In order to deal with this form of endogeneity, which skews the estimated coefficients and invalidates the results, the proposed model includes a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for all those municipalities that have the same structural characteristics and make up the group of candidate towns (*Candidate*). A second dummy variable is included that takes on a value of 1 only in the case of municipalities that became district capitals (*Capital*). A causal effect between capital status and population evolution is identified when the coefficient estimated for this second dummy takes on a positive and significant value. Table 5 gives details of the variables used.[16]

---

[15] Figure A.2.1 in Appendix 2 presents a comparison between the demographic evolution of each district capital and its main peer.

[16] A similar identification strategy was recently used in Chambru et al. (2022).

Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the variables

Variables	Nº	Av	SD	Min	Max
Main variables					
Capital	179	0.067	0.25	0	1
Candidate	179	0.22	0.42	0	1
Main control variables					
Population of municipality in 1787	179	1044.20	1031.41	99	4856
Crown officials in 1787	179	1.00	3.13	0	24
Artisans in 1787	179	23.95	36.10	0	206
Fabricants in 1787	179	6.70	29.05	0	278
First-nature geography					
Longitude	179	730005.9	23889.4	679220.3	778590.2
Latitude	179	4372147	67989.73	4276428	4494007
Temperature (ºC)	179	15.38	1.78	11	17.8
Rainfall (mm)	179	492.15	45.24	421	574
Elevation (m)	179	410.58	261.62	9	1067
Quality of the terrain	179	201.07	56.91	40.05	321.88
Second-nature geography					
Distance to primary roads (log km)	179	21.04	17.46	0.006	68.46
Distance to secondary roads (log km)	179	15.14	15.62	0.001	61.71
Post office in 1830	179	0.05	0.21	0	1

Note: Since the Floridablanca Census does not provide information about economic structure for the municipalities of Dolores, El Verger and Teresa, and bearing in mind that Dolores is a district capital, the final number of judicial districts in the sample goes down from 13 to 12 and the number of observations from 196 to 179. Table A.4.1 in Appendix 4 shows the results of the estimation of equation (2) using the whole sample of 13 judicial districts and 196 municipalities. Source: see text

The estimation was carried out by OLS on the sample of 179 municipalities that make up the 12 judicial districts for which it has been possible to obtain information for all the variables considered and– using PSM methodology – we have identified the existence of peers for district capital status. The estimation includes the consideration of clusters per district and robust standard errors. Table 6 presents the results for each of the points in time analysed.

Table 6. Results of the estimation of equation (2)

Dependent variable: population in each year
Econometric model: ordinary least squares

	1860	1877	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Capital	**0.16**	**0.22****	**0.24****	**0.26****	**0.30****	**0.32****	**0.30****
	(0.09)	**(0.09)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**
Candidate	0.08	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)
Population in 1787	0.86***	0.82***	0.81***	0.82***	0.84***	0.83***	0.84***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Crown officials	4.64	5.14	9.64	13.00*	8.68	9.43	8.72
	(4.28)	(6.17)	(6.06)	(6.89)	(9.71)	(11.16)	(10.47)
Artisans	-1.39	-0.85	-1.16	-1.76	-1.70	-1.46	-0.65
	(1.16)	(1.03)	(0.88)	(1.31)	(1.07)	(1.20)	(1.34)
Fabricants	-2.37**	-2.49*	-3.03**	-2.8*	-2.51	-2.25	-1.38
	(0.97)	(1.24)	(1.35)	(1.4)	(1.65)	(1.56)	(1.63)
Constant	-7,9	-19.36	-25.75	-15.43	-6.34	6.40	21.07
	(23,96)	(28.33)	(29.90)	(29.12)	(29.56)	(29.22)	(33.40)
First-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude and longitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Second-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	179	179	179	179	179	179	179
R^2	0.91	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.83	0.83	0.83

Note: The first-nature geography variables include average temperature, rainfall, elevation, roughness of the terrain and soil quality. The second-nature geography variables include a dummy that indicates the presence of a post office in 1830 and the distances from the municipalities to primary and secondary roads. The variables are significant at $*$ $p<0.1$*, $**$ $p<0.05$ and $***$ $p<0.01$. The Crown officials, artisans and fabricants variables are defined as the number of professional workers classified in these categories divided by the entity's population.

The results of these estimations show the presence of a positive and significant capital status effect for all the years considered between 1877 and 1930. The parameters estimated for the *capital* variable take on values ranging from 0.22 to 0.32, reaching their maximum in the 1920 census. This means that each district capital had a population between 24,6 and 37,71 percent higher[17] than it would have had otherwise, given its structural characteristics, with the greatest difference being recorded in 1920.

As explained above, this analysis was carried out on a sample of 179 observations corresponding to 12 judicial districts, out of a total of 46 districts and 496 Valencia region municipalities. In order to increase the number of municipalities in the treatment group

---

[17] A further explanation about how to interpret the dummies coefficient if the dependent variable is in logarithm form, can be found in Wooldrige (2012).

(capitals) and the control group (peers), we considered expanding the sample by including districts whose capitals and potential peers were in adjoining high probability blocks (blocks 3, 4 and 5, with probabilities greater than 0.4), making sure there were no significant differences in average probabilities between these blocks. For example, Villarreal is a non-capital entity (peer) with a probability that places it in block 3, while its district capital, Castellón de la Plana, is in block 4.[18] Using this criterion to determine capitals and peers increases the number of observations to 247 corresponding to 20 judicial districts.

Table 7. Results of the estimation of equation (2) with augmented sample

Dependent variable: population in each year
Econometric model: ordinary least squares

	1860	1877	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Capital	**0.13**	**0.17***	**0.22****	**0.25****	**0.26****	**0.30****	**0.25****
	(0.08)	**(0.09)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.09)**	**(0.09)**	**(0.09)**
Candidate	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.1)
Population in 1787	0.88***	0.87***	0.88***	0.88***	0.89***	0.88***	0.89***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Crown officials	11.40*	13.79**	19.02**	23.22**	20.34**	21.64**	20.25*
	(5.73)	(6.53)	(5.75)	(6.96)	(9.16)	(9.52)	(9.84)
Artisans	-0.27	0.55	0.21	-0.27	0.07	0.29	1.27
	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.04)	(1.24)	(1.11)	(1.16)	(1.20)
Fabricants	-1.76*	-1.44	-1.83	-1.47	-1.02	-0.64	0.17
	(0.98)	(1.24)	(1.41)	(1.44)	(1.66)	(1.62)	(1.76)
Constant	8.24	1.96	-4.00	1.66	4.67	10.69	21.07
	(21.97)	(23.71)	(26.27)	(25.25)	(24.83)	(25.70)	(33.40)
First-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude and longitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Second-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	247	247	247	247	247	247	247
R^2	0.91	0.89	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.85

Note: The first-nature geography variables include average temperature, rainfall, elevation, roughness of the terrain and soil quality. The second-nature geography variables include a dummy that indicates the presence of a post office in 1830 and the distances from the municipalities to primary and secondary roads. The variables are significant at * $p<0.1$*, ** $p<0.05$ and *** $p<0.01$. The Crown officials, artisans and fabricants variables are defined as the number of professional workers classified in these categories divided by the entity's population.

The results of the estimation of model 2 over this enlarged sample of entities are shown in Table 7. The results are similar to those of the base specifications. There exists a capital status

---

[18] It should be mentioned that the peer for Castellón de la Plana, Villarreal, was capital of its own judicial district in the original division of 1834 (see Table 1). However, it lost its capital status soon afterwards when it became part of the district of Castellón de la Plana.

effect that is positive and significant at all time points except for 1860. The estimated values fluctuate between 0.17 and 0.30, which indicates that capitals enjoy a population premium of between 18,53 and 34,99 percent, depending on the time point considered. Therefore, the results of the estimations presented in Table 7 confirm the existence of a capital status effect. In this case, the parameters estimated also reach their maximum in 1920 and indicate the existence of a population premium for district capitals that becomes consolidated across all the twentieth-century time points, reaching its peak in 1920.

However, it could be argued that these results might be over-influenced by the fact that the analysis included judicial districts whose capitals were also provincial capitals, since being chosen as provincial capital gave that municipality a great many more powers and functions on top of those corresponding to district capital. This bias would not appear in the base estimation as long as districts that were home to provincial capitals were not taken into account in the initial matching. It would, however, affect the estimation of the model with an augmented sample (Table 7), which includes the districts of Alicante and Castellón de la Plana. In order to verify the robustness of the previous results, we therefore repeated the estimation of the specification described in equation (2) on the increased sample of judicial districts, having removed the districts of Castellón de la Plana and Alicante. The results can be seen in Table 8.

Table 8. Results of the estimation of equation (2) omitting districts that include provincial capitals.

Dependent variable: population in each year
Econometric model: ordinary least squares

	1860	1877	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Capital	0.11	0.16*	0.21**	0.23**	0.24**	0.27**	0.22**
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Candidate	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.03	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Population in 1787	0.88***	0.87***	0.88***	0.88***	0.88***	0.88***	0.88***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Crown officials	10.54*	12.21*	17.02**	20.33**	16.54*	17.20*	14.99
	(5.42)	(6.16)	(5.51)	(6.29)	(8.37)	(8.92)	(9.15)
Artisans	-0.71	0.12	-0.29	-0.08	-0.57	-0.50	0.49
	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.05)	(1.27)	(1.08)	(1.10)	(1.09)
Fabricants	-1.88*	-1.57	-1.98	-1.66	-1.21	-0.92	-0.12
	(0.96)	(1.23)	(1.39)	(1.40)	(1.61)	(1.56)	(1.68)
Constant	8.20	1.55	-4.65	1.43	5.45	12.18	15.06
	(22.74)	(24.39)	(26.75)	(24.57)	(23.87)	(24.58)	(27.66)
First-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude and longitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Second-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	234	234	234	234	234	234	234
R^2	0.91	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.84	0.84

Note: The first-nature geography variables include average temperature, rainfall, elevation, roughness of the terrain and soil quality. The second-nature geography variables include a dummy that indicates the presence of a post office in 1830 and the distances from the municipalities to primary and secondary roads. The variables are significant at * $p<0.1$*, ** $p<0.05$ and *** $p<0.01$. The Crown officials, artisans and fabricants variables are defined as the number of professional workers classified in these categories divided by the entity's population.

As in previous estimations, the results enable us to identify a capital status effect for the time points stretching from 1877 to 1930. It is again confirmed that the statistical significance of this effect becomes consolidated over the first third of the twentieth century and that the value of the estimated parameter reaches its maximum in 1920. To be specific, the population premium for district capitals is estimated to range between 0.16 in 1877 to 0.27 in 1920.[19]

---

[19] It could be argued that the significance and value of the estimated coefficients could be driven by the fact that peers with very low estimated probabilities are considered as candidates. To test for this, Tables A.4.2 to A.4.4 in Appendix 4 show the results of the estimation of equation (2) considering, for each judicial district, only the capital and the peer with the highest probability. The results under these specifications confirm that capitals enjoy a population premium that ranges from 15 percent in 1860 to 35 percent in 1920.

5.- Conclusions

A productive line of research has pointed out the existence of a relationship between the state's capacity to collect taxes, provide services to its citizens and ensure compliance with the law and the development of societies. Various papers have supplied evidence of this (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Becker et al., 2020; Dell et al., 2018; Dincecco and Katz, 2014) and some investigations have argued that a state's capacity to carry out these functions must involve a state-building strategy. This includes not only the implementation of nation-building policies – explored in studies such as those by Bandiera et al. (2019), Alesina et al. (2020) and Alesina et al. (2021) – but also a plan for introducing them across the territory. Efficiency in both the raising of resources and the provision of public services will depend on this, as will the citizens' perception of the state and its functions.

A necessary step in this strategy is the hierarchical design and organization of the territory into population entities with different powers and provisions of state services and structures. Given that this is a necessary process, choosing the entities in which to concentrate public activity could in itself affect their development potential and impact their medium- and long-term evolution. To analyse this type of hypothesis, the most recent literature has used case studies to illustrate big administrative reforms such as the change in hierarchy of towns in China since the eleventh century (Bai and Jia, 2021) and those adopted in the dismantling of the ancien regime and the building of liberal nation-states in nineteenth-century Europe (Chambru et al., 2022, for France, and Cainelli et al, 2022, for Italy).

In the hope of contributing to this line of research, in this paper we have carried out an analysis of the territorial impact of the administrative reorganization of Spain by the liberal state during the nineteenth century, concentrating on the case of the former Kingdom of Valencia. Specifically, we have analysed the impact that this territorial reorganization might have had on its second level of administrative disaggregation, i.e. the judicial district. The advantage of studying the case of the Valencia region is the availability of detailed information about the structural conditions of its population entities before the reforms. There is sufficient evidence regarding the powers and functions that were transferred to the district capitals to enable us to carry out a detailed monitoring of how the population evolved

at a municipal level – an indicator of social and economic development – over the first stage in the construction of the Spanish liberal state.

The research has confirmed that, as far as the Valencia region is concerned, there was a causal relationship between a population entity's designation as a judicial district capital and the evolution of its population, compared to other centres with similar characteristics but without the functions and services associated with capital status. The work carried out has also shown that the effects associated with capital status took on greater consistency over time, i.e. as the state organized and used these centres as hubs for the provision of services and equipped them with the structures needed to provide them. In other words, the impact of rolling out the liberal state across the Spanish territory was consolidated in the first third of the twentieth century as it built up the capacity necessary to fulfil its main functions. The mechanisms whereby state activity generated a population premium in the judicial district capitals will be a subject for our attention in the future.

Bibliography

Acemoglu, D., Garcia-Jimeno, C. and Robinson, J.A. (2015), State capacity and economic development: a network approach, *American Economic Review*, 105(8), 2364-2409.

Acemoglu, Daron, Jacob Moscona, and James A. Robinson. (2016), "State Capacity and American Technology: Evidence from the Nineteenth Century." *American Economic Review*, 106(5): 61–67.

Alesina, A., Reich, B. and Riboni, A. (2020), Nation-building, nationalism, and wars, *Journal of Economic Growth,* 25, 381-430.

Alesina, A., Giuliano, P. and Reich, B. (2021), Nation-building and education, *Economic Journal*, 131, 638, 2273-2303.

Andini, M., Dalmazzo, A. and de Blasio, G. (2017), The size of political jurisdictions: A model with some evidence from a fascist consolidation, *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 45(4), 889– 909.

Artola, M. (1973), *La burguesía revolucionaria (1808-1869)*, Madrid, Alianza Universidad.

Bai, Y. and Jia, R. (2021), The economic consequences of political hierarchy: Evidence from regime changes in China, 1000-2000 C.E, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01091.

Bandiera, O., Mohnen, M., Rasul I. and Viarengo, M. (2019), Nation-building through compulsory schooling during the age of mass migration, *Economic Journal*, 129, 617, 62-109.

Becker, S.O., Rubin, J. and Woessmann, L. (2020), Religion in economic history: a survey, *IZA Working Papers*, DP No. 13371.

Beltrán Tapia, F. J., Díez-Minguela, A., Gómez-Tello, A., Martinez-Galarraga, J. and Tirado-Fabregat, D. A. (2020), Lordships, state capacity and beyond: literacy rates in mid-nineteenth-century Valencia, *European Historical Economics Society Working Paper,* No 196, Setember.

Beltrán Tapia, F. J., Díez-Minguela, A., Martinez-Galarraga, J. and Tirado-Fabregat, D. A. (2019), *Capital humano y desigualdad territorial. El proceso de alfabetización en los municipios españoles desde la Ley Moyano hasta la Guerra Civil*, Estudios de Historia Económica 74, Madrid: Banco de España.

Beltrán Tapia, F. J., Díez-Minguela, A., Fernández-Modrego, V., Gómez-Tello, A., Martinez-Galarraga, J. and Tirado-Fabregat, D. A. (2022), ESPAREL. A look at the relationship between population and territory in Spain in historical perspective, *Documentos de Trabajo de la AEHE*, Nº2207, October 2022.

Beltrán Tapia, F. J., Díez-Minguela, A., Martinez-Galarraga, J. and Tirado-Fabregat, D. A. (2023), The Spanish municipal population database (ESPOP) 1860-1930, DT-EHV-23/01, May 2023.

Bo, S. (2020), Centralization and regional development: Evidence from a political hierarchy reform to create cities in China, *Journal of Urban Economics*, 115, 103-182.

Bo, S. and Cheng, C. (2021), Political hierarchy and urban primacy: Evidence from China, *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 49(4), 933–946.

Burgueño, J. (1996), *Geografía política de la España constitucional*, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid.

Burgueño, J. (2011), *La invención de las provincias*, Madrid, Catarata.

Burgueño, J., Guerrero Lladós, M. (2014), 'El mapa municipal de España. Una caracterización geográfica'. *Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos Españoles* 64, 11-36.

Burillo Albacete, F. (2001), Las cárceles de partido judicial, 1834-1854, *ADPCP*, Vol. LIV, 323-398.

Cainelli, G., Ciccarelli, C. and Ganau, R. (2022), Administrative Reforms and Urban Development: Lessons from Italian Unification, *CEIS Tor Vergata, Research Paper Series*, Vol. 20, Issue 3, No. 538.

Caliendo, M., Kopeinig, S. (2008), Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of Propensity Score Matching, *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 22, 31-72.

Calvo Calvo, A.A. (2001), Los Inicios de las Comunicaciones en España: El Telégrafo, *Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 19 (3), 613-636

Castelló-Traver, J. E. (1978), *El país valenciano en el Censo de Floridablanca,* Institució Alfons el Magnanim-Centre Valencià d'Estudis i d'Investigació.

Chambru, C., Henry, E. and Marx, B. (2022), The Dynamic Consequences of State-Building: Evidence from the French Revolution, University of Zurich, *Department of Economics, Working Paper Series*, 406.

Cinnirella, F. and Schueler, R. (2018), Nation building. The role of central spending in education, *Explorations in Economic History,* 67, 18-39.

da Mata, D., Deichmann, U., Henderson, J. V., Lall, S. V. and Wang, H. G. (2007), Determinants of city growth in Brazil, *Journal of Urban Economics*, 62(2), 252-272.

Dell, M., Lane, N. and Querubin, P. (2018), The historical state, local collective action, and economic development in Vietnam, *Econometrica*, 86(6), 2083-2121.

Dincecco, M. and Katz, G. (2014), State capacity and long-run economic performance, *Economic Journal*, 126, 189-218.

Dittmar, J.E., and Meisenzahl, R. (2020), Public Goods Institutions, Human Capital and Growth: Evidence from German History. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 87(2): 959–996.

Feiock, R. C. and Kim, J. H. (2001), Form of government, administrative organization, and local economic development policy, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 11(1), 29-49.

Garcia Carrero, F (2019), El Puesto de la Guardia Civil, entre la milicia y la vecindad, *Almenara: revista extremeña de ciencias sociales*, 11, 27-46

Gomez Diaz, J. (2008), División Territorial de España. Provincias y Partidos Judiciales 175 Años, Toletum: boletín de la Real Academia de Bellas Artes y Ciencias Históricas de Toledo, 85, 151-175+ç

Hernández-Franco, J (1987), La realización del censo de Floridablanca en el corregimiento de Murcia, Studia histórica: Historia Moderna, 5 , 285-296

Imbens, G.W. and Rubin, D.B. (2015), "*Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences: An Introduction*" Cambrige University Press.

Lee, A. (2019), "Land, State Capacity, and Colonialism: Evidence From India." *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(3): 412–444.

Livi Bacci, M. (1987), Il Censimento di Floridablanca nel contesto dei censimenti europei. *Genus* 43, 137-151.

Melón, A. (1977), De la división de Floridablanca a la del 1833. *Estudios geográficos* 38, 617-664.

Neubert, M. (2023), Leviathan's Shadow: The Imperial Legacy of State Capacity and Economic Development in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, *European Historical Economics Society Working Paper,* No. 231, February.

Orduña Rebollo, E. (2000), "Introducción" en A.A.V.V., Subdivisión en Partidos Judiciales de la Nueva División Territorial de la Península e Islas Adyacentes de 1834", Edición Ed. Boletín Oficial del Estado, Madrid.

Pérez Moreda, V. (2010), La estadística demográfica en el gobierno de la España ilustrada: recuerdo y elogio del Censo de Floridablanca. *Índice: Revista de Estadística y Sociedad* 43, 8-17.

Puigvert i Solà, J.M. (2022), *Liberarismo y Salud Pública en España: Del higienismo a la bacteriología (1855-1918)* en Calatayud, S., Millán, J. and Cruz-Romero, Mª. (Eds.), Reformas antes del Reformismo, Estado y Sociedad de Élites en las España contemporánea, Editorial Comares, Granada.

Reher, D.S. (1986), Desarrollo urbano y evolución de la población: España 1787-1930. *Revista de Historia Económica – Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History* 4, 39-66.

Roldán Verdejo, R. (1982), "Un "Obedézcase pero no se cumpla" tardío: La Laguna,1836" en A.A.V.V., Instituto de Estudios Canarios 50 aniversario (1932-1982), Tomo II Humanidades, núm. 1º, Ed. Instituto de Estudios Canarios, Santa Cruz de Tenerife.

Vilar Ramírez, J.B. (1982), Censo de Aranda en el obispado de Orihuela (1769) Aproximación a la demografía valenciana moderna. *Anales de Historia Contemporánea*, 1, 217-277.

Wooldrige, J. (2012), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press.

Voth, Hans-Joachim (2021), "*Persistence–myth and mystery*," in Alberto Bisin and Giovanni Federico (eds.) Handbook of Historical Economics. London: Academic Press: 243–68.

Acknowledgements

Appendix 1: Data

Table A.1.1. List of capitals and peers and their basic characteristics

Municipality	Population in 1787	Distance to primary roads	Distance to secondary roads	Elevation	Estimated probability
Albaida	**2962**	15.84	1.34	407	0.21
Benigànim	2988	12.05	0.29	242	0.24
L'Olleria	3125	7.52	4.8	267	0.23
Alberique	**2061**	0.006	4.96	78	0.09
Villanueva de Castellón	1471	2.36	9.93	106	0.027
Albocácer	**1055**	18.54	8.66	554	0.01
Benassal	1761	22.48	3.07	890	0.10
Catí	1354	6.6	12.83	726	0.04
Les Coves de Vinromà	1320	0.06	16.53	333	0.05
Callosa de Ensarriá	**3510**	46.25	8.42	424	0.21
Altea	4380	46.78	0.29	275	0.37
Benissa	3111	61.92	0.03	168	0.20
Chiva	**2980**	0.43	28.33	264	0.28
Cheste	2794	2.71	26.78	222	0.24
Dénia	**2117**	60.74	0.05	96	0.07
Pedreguer	1621	56.70	9.09	153	0.01
Teulada	1742	65.36	4.82	145	0.03
Xaló	1584	56.03	4.52	204	0.01
Jávea	3367	66.94	12.22	105	0.22
Dolores	**2117**	9.24	16.31	18	0.04
Albatera	2116	0.019	11.62	60	0.05
Almoradí	3121	10.40	13.61	19	0.15
Benejúzar	2196	8.75	9.21	28	0.05
Catral	1638	5.21	14.90	29	0.01
Callosa de Segura	3385	4.38	7.07	46	0.20
Guardamar del Segura	2349	19.74	25.35	8	0.05
Lucena	**2099**	24.91	20.56	616	0.15
L'Alcora	3783	16.44	12.06	333	0.49
Atzaneta	1332	24.89	18.39	559	0.03
Cortes de Arenoso	1155	18.67	42.70	996	0.02
Useras	1330	19.05	14.82	414	0.03
Villahermosa	1432	28.94	34.25	1032	0.05

Vistabella	1248	37.67	30.06	1067	0.03
Nules	**2804**	**0.04**	**12.41**	**73**	**0.26**
Borriana	3779	3.48	7.07	44	0.45
Onda	4357	13.63	15.09	294	0.57
La Vall d'Uixó	4078	5.01	18.81	155	0.49
San Mateo	**2318**	**15.44**	**0.001**	**380**	**0.31**
Alcalà de Xivert	2887	0.60	8.59	248	0.30
Sueca	**4856**	**15.26**	**0.25**	**10**	**0.58**
Cullera	4667	21.45	0.05	9	0.36
Villar del Arzobispo	**1743**	**28.63**	**53.34**	**547**	**0.08**
Alcublas	1511	16.42	53.16	698	0.05
Viver	**1697**	**0.017**	**43.91**	**769**	**0.08**
Bejís	2216	8.03	53.10	967	0.17
Caudiel	1168	3.51	3.51	740	0.02
Puebla de Arenoso	1443	11.86	11.86	914	0.05
Jérica	2707	0.11	0.11	728	0.27

Source: see text. Judicial district capitals are in bold, and beneath them their peers.

Appendix 2: Demographic evolution of each district capital and its main peer

Figure A.2.1. Demographic evolution of each district capital and its main peer

Chiva

Denia

Dolores

Lucena

Population (in Logs)

Year

Capital Population

Candidate Population

Source: see text

Note: The red bar in 1834 indicates the enactment of the law governing judicial districts.

Appendix 3: Maps

Map A.3.1.- Judicial district capitals and peers added to the enlarged sample.

Note: District capitals are shown in green, while peers are in purple.
Source: see text.

Appendix 4: Additional Robustness checks.

The general results of our analysis are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. Table A4.1 shows the results of equation (2) using the original sample of 196 municipalities obtained after the PSM procedure. In this case economic structure is not included as control because data for the municipality of Dolores, capital of the district of the same name, are not available in the Floridablanca Census.

Table A.4.1. Results of the estimation of equation (2)

| Dependent variable: population in each year Econometric model: ordinary least squares	1860	1877	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Capital	**0.15***	**0.18**	**0.18**	**0.20**	**0.24***	**0.28****	**0.26***
	(0.07)	**(0.10)**	**(0.13)**	**(0.13)**	**(0.12)**	**(0.11)**	**(0.12)**
Candidate	0.09	0.15	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.14	0.10
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Population in 1787	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***	0.81***	0.83***	0.83***	0.84***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Constant	6.68	-1.21	1.14	8.17	15.29	32.12	42.11
	(25.56)	(32.05)	(35.52)	(33.40)	(36.46)	(36.82)	(38.98)
First-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude and longitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Second-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	196	196	196	196	196	196	196
R^2	0.91	0.86	0.85	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83

Note: The first-nature geography variables include average temperature, rainfall, elevation, soil quality and roughness of the terrain. The second-nature geography variables include a dummy that indicates the presence of a post office in 1830 and the distances from the municipalities to primary and secondary roads. The variables are significant at * $p<0.1$*, ** $p<0.05$ and *** $p<0.01$.

Tables A.4.2 to A.4.4 show, for both basic and augmented samples, the results of the estimation of equation (2), considering for each judicial district only the capital and the peer with the highest probability.

Table A.4.2. Results of the estimation of equation (2), base sample, and only considering one peer per district capital.

Dependent variable: population in each year
Econometric model: ordinary least squares

	1860	1877	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Capital	**0.15***	**0.24****	**0.27*****	**0.28****	**0.34****	**0.35****	**0.32****
	(0.07)	**(0.10)**	**(0.10)**	**(0.10)**	**(0.10)**	**(0.10)**	**(0.11)**
Candidate	0.06	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Population in 1787	0.87***	0.85***	0.84***	0.85***	0.87***	0.86***	0.86***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Crown officials	4.29	4.83	9.18	12.56	8.37	9.15	8.57
	(4.50)	(6.24)	(6.09)	(7.02)	(9.95)	(11.46)	(10.86)
Artisans	-1.24	-0.65	-0.89	-1.49	-1.44	-1.24	-0.52
	(1.07)	(0.93)	(0.70)	(1.06)	(0.89)	(1.07)	(1.19)
Fabricants	-1.96*	-1.82	-2.16	-2.00	-1.61	-1.49	-0.92
	(1.16)	(1.49)	(1.59)	(1.65)	(1.88)	(1.77)	(1.92)
Constant	-5.18	-15.80	-20.91	-10.67	-1.92	10.21	23.32
	(23.56)	(28.48)	(30.45)	(29.69)	(30.19)	(29.00)	(32.97)
First-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude and longitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Second-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	179	179	179	179	179	179	179
R^2	0.91	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.83	0.83

Note: The first-nature geography variables include average temperature, rainfall, elevation, soil quality and roughness of the terrain. The second-nature geography variables include a dummy that indicates the presence of a post office in 1830 and the distances from the municipalities to primary and secondary roads. The variables are significant at * $p<0.1$*, ** $p<0.05$ and *** $p<0.01$. The Crown officials, artisans and fabricants variables are defined as the number of professional workers classified in these categories divided by the entity's population.

Table A.4.3. Results of the estimation of equation (2), augmented sample, and only considering one peer per district capital.

Dependent variable: population in each year
Econometric model: ordinary least squares

	1860	1877	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Capital	**0.10**	**0.14**	**0.17***	**0.21****	**0.25****	**0.28****	**0.23****
	(0.07)	**(0.09)**	**(0.09)**	**(0.09)**	**(0.10)**	**(0.10)**	**(0.11)**
Candidate	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.03	0.02	-0.002
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Population in 1787	0.88***	0.86***	0.87***	0.87***	0.89***	0.88***	0.88***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Crown officials	11.36*	13.71*	18.87**	23.15**	20.35**	21.51**	19.94*
	(5.85)	(6.57)	(5.84)	(7.00)	(9.20)	(9.67)	(9.96)
Artisans	-0.33	0.50	0.13	-0.33	-0.04	0.28	1.27
	(1.02)	(1.01)	(0.96)	(1.17)	(1.09)	(1.17)	(1.25)
Fabricants	-1.63	-1.37	-1.80	-1.39	-0.93	-0.76	-0.23
	(1.08)	(1.37)	(1.54)	(1.56)	(1.76)	(1.69)	(1.88)
Constant	9.86	3.11	-2.96	2.87	5.63	9.97	10.48
	(20.05)	(21.03)	(23.27)	(22.72)	(22.75)	(23.50)	(26.96)
First-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude and longitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Second-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	247	247	247	247	247	247	247
R²	0.92	0.89	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.85

Note: The first-nature geography variables include average temperature, rainfall, elevation, soil quality and roughness of the terrain. The second-nature geography variables include a dummy that indicates the presence of a post office in 1830 and the distances from the municipalities to primary and secondary roads. The variables are significant at * $p<0.1$*, ** $p<0.05$ and *** $p<0.01$. The Crown officials, artisans and fabricants variables are defined as the number of professional workers classified in these categories divided by the entity's population.

Table A.4.4. Results of the estimation of equation (2), augmented sample, without provincial capitals and considering only one peer per district capital.

Dependent variable: population in each year
Econometric model: ordinary least squares

	1860	1877	1887	1900	1910	1920	1930
Capital	**0.05**	**0.10**	**0.13**	**0.17***	**0.20****	**0.22****	**0.16***
	(0.06)	**(0.09)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.08)**	**(0.09)**
Candidate	0.15*	0.14	0.18*	0.16	0.11	0.11	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Population in 1787	0.87***	0.86***	0.86***	0.87***	0.88***	0.87***	0.87***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Crown officials	10.20*	11.87*	16.62**	20.00**	16.38*	16.85*	14.51
	(5.57)	(6.22)	(5.58)	(6.27)	(8.46)	(9.05)	(9.12)
Artisans	-0.84	-0.004	-0.45	-1.02	-0.67	-0.61	0.41
	(0.94)	(0.92)	(0.84)	(1.07)	(0.93)	(0.98)	(1.06)
Fabricants	-1.72	-1.42	-1.84	-1.44	-0.97	-0.88	-0.36
	(1.13)	(1.44)	(1.61)	(1.61)	(1.77)	(1.73)	(1.95)
Constant	10.89	4.16	-1.83	4.71	8.48	13.57	14.00
	(20.13)	(20.84)	(22.71)	(21.05)	(20.88)	(21.49)	(25.18)
First-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latitude and longitude	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Second-nature geography	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	234	234	234	234	234	234	234
R^2	0.91	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.84	0.84

Note: The first-nature geography variables include average temperature, rainfall, elevation, soil quality and roughness of the terrain. The second-nature geography variables include a dummy that indicates the presence of a post office in 1830 and the distances from the municipalities to primary and secondary roads. The variables are significant at * $p<0.1$*, ** $p<0.05$ and *** $p<0.01$. The Crown officials, artisans and fabricants variables are defined as the number of professional workers classified in these categories divided by the entity's population.

VNIVERSITAT Ð VALÈNCIA

RESUMEN DE MATRÍCULA CURSO ACADÉMICO 2022-2023

DATOS ACADÉMICOS DEL ESTUDIANTE					
NOMBRE	**FERNANDEZ MODREGO VICTOR**	NPA	**MB64524**	DNI	**21780868Y**
DOMICILIO	**ALBUIXECH 21 4t**			TELÉF.	**667954729**
MUNICIPIO	**VALENCIA - 46021 - VALENCIA**				
TITULACIÓN	**HISTORIA ECONÓMICA**				
AUTORIZACIONES	**Descritas en última hoja**		Ha manifestado que tiene la intención de pedir beca		

DISTRIBUCIÓN DE LA MATRÍCULA

CONCEPTO		GR.	V. MAT.
30002	Tutela RD 99/2011		1
52310	Plan de Investigación 3	DO	1

VALORACIÓN ECONÓMICA DE LA MATRÍCULA			
TIPO EXENCIÓN	**Sin exención**	TIPO DE PAGO	**1 PLAZO**
SEGURO ESCOLAR	**SI**	DATOS BANCARIOS	

Unidades	Concepto	Importe Unitario	Importe Línea
1,00	LIN.INVESTIG	0,00 €	0,00 €
1,00	TUT.ACA.TDOC	270,00 €	270,00 €
1,00	TJTA.UNIVERS	5,28 €	5,28 €
1,00	SEGURO ESC.	1,12 €	1,12 €
			IMPORTE TOTAL : 276,40 €

Si usted tiene derecho a alguna de las exenciones de tasas legalmente establecidas, éstas se aplicarán antes de la emisión del correspondiente recibo.

Si necesitas más información o desea resolver alguna duda, consulte el siguiente enlace
https://www.uv.es/websiuv/suportmat/cas

En el siguiente enlace puedes subir la documentación requerida para tu titulación:
https://ir.uv.es/siuv/AdjuntarDocMatricula
En el siguiente enlace puedes informarte del reglamento que se aplica en la gestión de los recibos:
https://ir.uv.es/siuv/ReglamentoRecibos

Cabría la posibilidad de que los grupos/subgrupos podrían suprimirse si no se llega al mínimo establecido en normativa

La presente notificación supone un extracto de la matrícula realizada en el día de hoy y está sujeto al cumplimiento de los requisitos administrativos necesarios en especial respecto del pago de los precios públicos, de acuerdo con la normativa vigente

Firma: Valencia 26 de junio - 2023

Autorizo a ceder mis datos personales para el cumplimiento de fines directamente relacionados con las funciones legítimas del cedente y del cesionario en los siguientes casos:

-Empresas, fundaciones y entidades que persigan finalidades de gestión, promoción y realización de prácticas voluntarias (prescindible). SI

-Empresas, fundaciones y entidades que persigan finalidades de promoción del empleo o inserción profesional con consentimiento expreso del titular. SI

-Departamentos, institutos de investigación, unidades de investigación y personal docente e investigador de la Universitat de València para la realización de estudios e investigaciones científicas con consentimiento expreso del titular. SI

-Empresas, fundaciones y entidades que ofrezcan ventajas y descuentos para los miembros de la comunidad universitaria mediante convenios con terceros que requieran validar la condición de estudiante del beneficiario a petición de éste. SI

-Programa de mentoria de estudiantes (Entreiguales) más información en https://www.uv.es/uvweb/servicio-informacion-dinamizacion-sedi/es/informacion-soporte/mentoria-entreiguals/-quieres-tener-mentor/a-1286171613844.html. NO

-En caso de Denegación de la solicitud de Beca: Si Vd. ha elegido pagar su matrícula en 8 plazos y su solicitud de beca es denegada, se le fraccionará el importe en los plazos que queden por pasar al cobro, teniendo en cuenta además que en el primer recibo se incluirá el importe total de las tasas y plazos no abonados hasta ese momento. Los plazos que resten se calcularán con los importes de la mensualidad correspondiente.

(90)5070461800106283062004696980046960000276400

Universitat de València

Rebut cobrament

Data d'emissió	Núm. de l'emissora	Núm. de referència	Identificació	Import
01-12-2022	**04618001-062**	**8306200469698**	**004696**	***276,40**

Entitat emissora	Estudiant
Universitat de València	**FERNANDEZ MODREGO, VICTOR**

SECRET: **ESC. DOCTORADO**   NIF/CIF: **21780868Y**   PLAZO: 1

1 LIN.INVESTI.G 0   1 TUT.ACA.TDO.C 270   1 TJTA.UNIVER.S 5,28   1 SEGURO ESC.. 1,12

EL PAGAMENT D´AQUEST DOCUMENT ES POT EFECTUAR EN QUALSEVOL SUCURSAL DE:

CaixaBank   Banco Sabadell
Banco Santander   Caixa Ontinyent

AQUEST EXEMPLAR NO ALLIBERA DE L´OBLIGACIÓ DE FER-NE EL PAGAMENT, QUE S´HAURA D'ACREDITAR AMB EL REBUT CORRESPONENT

Universitat de València

Rebut

Data d'emissió	Núm. de l'emissora	Núm. de referència	Identificació	Import
01-12-2022	**04618001-062**	**8306200469698**	**004696**	***276,40**

Entitat emissora	Estudiant
Universitat de València	**FERNANDEZ MODREGO, VICTOR**

SECRET: **ESC. DOCTORADO**   NIF/CIF: **21780868Y**   PLAZO: 1

1 LIN.INVESTI.G 0   1 TUT.ACA.TDO.C 270   1 TJTA.UNIVER.S 5,28   1 SEGURO ESC.. 1,12

Rebem l´import per abonar-lo a l´ENTITAT EMISSORA

Per la CAIXA o BANC,

(signatura i segell)

Exemp.2-ESTUDIANT AQUEST DOCUMENT NO SERÀ VÀLID SENSE LA CERTIFICACIÓ MECÀNICA O LA SIGNATURA AUTORITZADA I EL SEGELL DE CAIXA O DEL BANC

Universitat de València

Duplicat Rebut

Data d'emissió	Núm. de l'emissora	Núm. de referència	Identificació	Import
01-12-2022	**04618001-062**	**8306200469698**	**004696**	***276,40**

Entitat emissora	Estudiant
Universitat de València	**FERNANDEZ MODREGO, VICTOR**

SECRET: **ESC. DOCTORADO**   NIF/CIF: **21780868Y**   PLAZO: 1

1 LIN.INVESTI.G 0   1 TUT.ACA.TDO.C 270   1 TJTA.UNIVER.S 5,28   1 SEGURO ESC.. 1,12

Rebem l´import per abonar-lo a l´ENTITAT EMISSORA

Per la CAIXA o BANC,

(signatura i segell)

Exemp.2-ESTUDIANT -> CENTRE AQUEST DOCUMENT NO SERÀ VÀLID SENSE LA CERTIFICACIÓ MECÀNICA O LA SIGNATURA AUTORITZADA I EL SEGELL DE CAIXA O DEL BANC

Id: UV-DDC001-2506514   Cod. Verificació: 8AXKU64PU749N0N2